Editor's note: Marc
Lynch is director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George
Washington University, editor of the Middle East blog on ForeignPolicy.com,
(CNN) -- The stunning assassinations of several key Syrian leaders and the outbreak of serious combat in Damascus last week momentarily held out the possibility that President Bashar al-Assad's regime will rapidly fall. Many hoped for a cascade of defections, a rise in popular demonstrations and a rebel surge to bring down the government.
Those hopes were
exaggerated, fueled by a feverish rumor mill, psychological warfare and
notoriously unreliable information coming out of Syria. While the regime
has been shaken, its military capability stands as demonstrated by its
bloody reassertion of control over Damascus. Along with the support of
Russia, its determination to survive at any price could draw out the
endgame.
The assassinations struck
at the heart of the security machine that sustains the regime, and they
highlight the extent to which political and military tide has long
since turned against al-Assad. The assassinations were more of an
inflection than a turning point.
Diplomatically isolated,
financially strapped and increasingly constrained by a wide range of
international sanctions, al-Assad's regime has been left with little
room to maneuver. It resorts to indiscriminate military force and uses
shabiha gangs and propaganda to inflict terror.
The government's violence
against peaceful protestors and innocent civilians has been manifestly
self-defeating. Al-Assad has failed to kill his way to victory. Day by
day, through accumulating mistakes, the regime is losing legitimacy and
control of Syria and its people.
Nonetheless, it's premature to think the end is close.
The opposition's
progress, reportedly with increasing external funding and training, has
put greater pressure on al-Assad's forces. But the opposition's military
success has exacerbated the fears of retribution attacks and a reign of
chaos should the regime crumble.
The much-maligned
political efforts of U.N. special envoy Kofi Annan, backed by the United
States, were meant to find a political solution that could prevent
precisely such a deterioration of the situation on the ground.
Now, even if al-Assad's
regime collapses, violence may prove difficult to contain given that the
country is deeply polarized and awash in weapons. Al-Assad's end could
pave the way for an even more intense civil war.
Making matters worse,
the continuing fragmentation among the Syrian opposition groups raises
deep fears about their ability to unite themselves or to establish
authority. Few foundations exist for an inclusive and stable political
order after al-Assad.
The Obama administration
was prudent and wise to avoid a direct military intervention in Syria. A
legion of pundits deemed an American military role necessary for any
progress against al-Assad. Clearly, it was not.
Indeed, a limited
intervention would likely have strengthened al-Assad's hand at home and
abroad. Had the U.S. chosen to carry out airstrikes to enforce a no-fly
zone or safe havens, Syria's crisis would likely be no closer to
resolution but America would be deeply embroiled.
Some have suggested that
the U.S. should provide weapons to favored factions among the
opposition groups. This, too, is a dangerous idea. There is no reason to
believe that these factions would reward the U.S. with loyalty.
What the U.S. should do
is focus its efforts on maintaining international pressure and sanctions
on al-Assad while preparing for a transition. It should disseminate
credible information about the regime's atrocities. It should
aggressively plan to bring the architects of Syria's well-documented
massacres to face international justice. (It is far too late for an
amnesty for al-Assad and his top aides, but lower-level officials should
be offered a deadline to defect to avoid prosecution.)
When al-Assad falls, the
Syrian opposition will urgently need to unite Syria and short-circuit
the emergence of an insurgency from supporters of the old regime.
Preventing reprisal killings, including all groups in the political
process, and incorporating public servants who are not implicated in war
crimes will be essential.
The U.S. should help
prepare the Syrian opposition for the challenges of governing a
fractured country by facilitating the negotiation for a representative
and unified political entity, with a greater role for pragmatic leaders
on the inside. It could send a small U.N. stabilization force to Syria
to as a monitor. And it will have to persuade the armed insurgency to
police its own ranks to avoid sectarian fights.
The hopes of a soft
landing in Syria have been destroyed by the regime's violence. The U.S.
must now try to deal as best it can with the grinding struggle to come.